Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Faculty Publications

Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Department

9-28-2018

CMAPS: A Chess-Based Multi-Facet Password Scheme for Mobile
Devices
Ye Zhu
Cleveland State University, y.zhu61@csuohio.edu

Jonathan Gurary
John Carroll University

George Corser
Saginaw Valley State University

Jared Oluoch
University of Toledo

Nahed Alnahash
Oakland University

See next
page
additional
authors
Follow
this
andfor
additional
works
at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Repository Citation
Zhu, Ye; Gurary, Jonathan; Corser, George; Oluoch, Jared; Alnahash, Nahed; Fu, Huirong; and Tang, Junhua,
"CMAPS: A Chess-Based Multi-Facet Password Scheme for Mobile Devices" (2018). Electrical Engineering
& Computer Science Faculty Publications. 434.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub/434

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Department at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electrical Engineering & Computer
Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

Authors
Ye Zhu, Jonathan Gurary, George Corser, Jared Oluoch, Nahed Alnahash, Huirong Fu, and Junhua Tang

This article is available at EngagedScholarship@CSU: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub/434

IEEE Access
Multidisciplinary

Rapid Review Open Access Journal

Received July 1, 2018, accepted September 16, 2018, date of publication September 28, 2018, date of current version October 19, 2018.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2872772

CMAPS: A Chess-Based Multi-Facet Password
Scheme for Mobile Devices
YE ZHU ID
1, (Member, IEEE), JONATHAN GURARY2, GEORGE CORSER3, (Member, IEEE),
JARED OLUOCH4, NAHED ALNAHASH5, HUIRONG FU5, (Member, IEEE), AND JUNHUA TANG6
1
2
3
4
5
6

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA
John Carroll University, University Heights, OH 44118, USA
Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, Saginaw Valley State University, Saginaw, MI 48603, USA
Department of Engineering Technology, University of Toledo, Toledo, OH 43606, USA
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Oakland University, Rochester, MI 48309, USA
School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China

Corresponding author: Ye Zhu (y.zhu61@csuohio.edu)
This work was supported in part by the Faculty Development Award from Cleveland State University and in part by the U.S. National
Science Foundation under Grant CNS-1338105, Grant CNS-1343141, Grant CNS-1460897, Grant DGE-1623713, and
Grant DGE-1821775.

ABSTRACT It has long been recognized, by both security researchers and human-computer interaction
researchers, that no silver bullet for authentication exists to achieve security, usability, and memorability.
Aiming to achieve the goals, we propose a Multi-fAcet Password Scheme (MAPS) for mobile authentication.
MAPS fuses information from multiple facets to form a password, allowing MAPS to enlarge the password
space and improve memorability by reducing memory interference, which impairs memory performance
according to psychology interference theory. The information fusion in MAPS can increase usability,
as fewer input gestures are required for passwords of the same security strength. Based on the idea of
MAPS, we implement a Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) for Android systems. Only two and six gestures are
required for CMAPS to generate passwords with better security strength than 4-digit PINs and 8-character
alphanumeric passwords, respectively. Our user studies showthatCMAPScan achieve high recall rates while
exceeding the security strength of standard 8-character alphanumeric passwords usedfor secure applications.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, human computer interaction, graphical user interfaces.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper studies authentication on mobile devices with
touch screens. As mobile devices such as smartphones
become increasingly popular, so does the realization that
security is an important requirement for the use of mobile
devices in our daily life. In 2013, annual worldwide smart
phone shipments topped 1 billion for the first time [1]. The
popularity of these mobile devices is due to a unique set of
features including ubiquitous Internet access through com
munication technologies such as Wifi and 4G/LTE, easy
to use touch-based inputs, and numerous applications and
games. In the meantime, the security of mobile devices is
becoming a major concern as device users are storing sen
sitive data such as personal contacts and utilizing sensitive
applications like banking and stock trading.
Authentication, the first defense mechanism preventing
unauthorized access to a mobile device, allows owners of
mobile devices to unlock and use their devices.
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Designing an authentication scheme formobile devices is a
challenging task because the scheme should be secure, capa
ble of generating human-memorable passwords, and usable.
A secure authentication scheme should have a large password
space, i.e., a large number of possible passwords. Obviously
the passwords generated by the scheme should also be easy
to remember. In this paper, we separate memorability from
usability to emphasize the importance of memorability. It has
long been recognized that no silver bullet exists to achieve
both security and memorability [2]. Obviously with the addi
tion of a usability requirement, the task becomes even more
challenging.
The alphanumeric password scheme, which has been used
for decades for various computer systems, is not suitable for
mobile authentication. The scheme generally requires a key
board for quick input of alphanumeric passwords. However,
mostcurrentmobile devices are not equipped with ahardware
keyboard. Instead, most mobile devices support the touch

2169-3536 © 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only.
Personal use is also permitted,butrepublication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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based soft keyboard, which replaces the hardware keyboard
with an on-screen image map of keys. Due to the limited
size of the soft keyboard, text input is relatively slow [3]
and typo-prone, leading to frustrating usability issues. Poor
usability, in turn, can lead to users choosing short or easy to
type passwords as a workaround.
In this paper, we propose the Multi-fAcet Password
Scheme (MAPS) for mobile authentication. Instead of repeat
ing the same type of information, such as characters in
alphanumeric passwords and dot connections in Google's
pattern unlock, MAPS combines information from multi
ple facets, i.e., multiple types of information, to generate
passwords. Because of combining information from multiple
facets, MAPS can generate a huge number of passwords.
Passwords generated by MAPS are easy to remember because
(1) MAPS is an authentication scheme based on graphical
passwords, which have been proven easier to remember than
alphanumeric passwords [4], (2) MAPS can fuse information
from multiple facets through a single gesture on the touch
screen, (3) MAPS can greatly reduce memory interference,
a psychology effect leading to forgetting, and (4) graphical
hints designed for MAPS can further increase the memorabil
ity of passwords. MAPS is also easy to use on mobile devices
since passwords generated by MAPS can be input on touch
screens with just a small number of gestures.
The contributions made in this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We propose a Multi-fAcet Password Scheme (MAPS)
for mobile authentication. MAPS can generate a huge
amount of possible passwords. MAPS is also easy to
remember and easy to use on mobile devices. Based
on the idea of MAPS, we design and implement a
Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) as an example of MAPS.
• We formally analyze the security strength of CMAPS
and prove that CMAPS is more secure than existing
mobile authentication schemes. Only 2 and 6 gestures
are required for CMAPS to generate passwords with
better security strength than 4-digit PINs and 8-character
alphanumeric passwords respectively. The advantage is
because CMAPS can fuse information from multiple
facets through a single gesture and using multiple facets
can significantly enlarge the password space.
• We formally analyze the usability of CMAPS and show
that CMAPS has better usability, since one gesture in
CMAPS brings a larger amount of information than
other schemes.
• Our user studies show that CMAPS, with security
strength exceeding the strength of current mobile
authentication schemes and exceeding the requirements
of banking, can achieve high recall rates after one week.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews related work on graphical passwords, mobile authen
tication, and memory interference. In Section III, we outline
the threat model considered in this paper. In Section IV,
we formally define the key criteria for mobile authentication
methods. In Section V, we first present the design of MAPS
54796

and then use CMAPS as an example to explain the rationales
behind the design. In Section 6, we theoretically analyze
the security strength and usability of CMAPS. Section VII
presents our user studies on the memorability and usability
of CMAPS. In Section VIII, we discuss the user studies
and possible extensions of MAPS. We conclude the paper in
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK

In this section, we review related work on graphical pass
words, mobile authentication, and gamification.
A. GRAPHICAL PASSWORDS

The original proposal for the graphical password is the US
patent filed by Blonder [5] in 1996. Blonder's implemen
tation shows users a number of ‘‘tap regions'' in a prede
termined image, and requires users to set a password by
arranging these regions by location and sequence. These
regions are then hidden from view, leaving only the original
reference image. To re-authenticate, the user must select the
‘‘tap regions'' in the same sequence.
It was inferred that a graphical approach provides better
memorability than traditional passwords because the human
brain is relatively weak at remembering sequences of num
bers or letters, but good at processing visual data [5], [6].
That assumption was based on the picture superiority effect,
the notion that humans have a much greater capacity for
processing and remembering visual data than numbers and
letters [7]. This hypothesis was eventually supported by fur
ther research [4]. Tullis et al. [8] shows that graphical pass
words can remain memorable even years after they are no
longer in use. CMAPS is also one type of graphical password
schemes. In addition CMAPS further enhance memorability
by reducing memory interference through combining multi
ple facet information.
As graphical authentication schemes gained popularity,
they were grouped into three categories: recognition-based
schemes, recall-based schemes, or cued-recall schemes [9].
The classification is based on memory tasks as outlined
in [10]. These three memory operations are handled in dif
ferent ways. In recognition, the subject is tasked with merely
identifying if something is familiar, for example asking a
person if they have seen a certain picture before. Recall
requires accessing something directly from memory, a more
challenging task, for example asking a person to reproduce a
drawing they once made. Cued-recall provides a hint, such as
the background of the drawing, but again requires the subject
to draw up something from memory.
In recognition-based schemes, such as Deja Vu [11],
the user is prompted to identify previously selected images.
Users initially create a portfolio of images, taken from a large
set of abstract images consisting of basic fractal and color
patterns. To authenticate themselves, users must pick images
from their portfolio out from a number of decoy images.
Passface [12] is a commercial example of recognition-based
authentication built for the open market. This software works
VOLUME 6, 2018
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largely in the same way as Deja Vu, except that pictures
of human faces are used in place of abstract images. Some
research has suggested that using familiar imagery such as
human faces weakens graphical schemes, as it opens them
up to various selection biases [13]. Other research has found
that people prefer faces from certain groups, for example
elderly people remember PassFaces passwords better when
faces of older people are used [14]. Our scheme uses common
imagery that should not have any age, gender, or cultural
biases.
Recall-based schemes, such as Draw-A-Secret [6], ask
users to reproduce a secret drawing or gesture, typically
with a touch screen or pointing device. Users create a
Draw-A-Secret password by drawing a gesture on their touch
screen PDA, and authenticate themselves by reproducing
it. A gesture is considered a line drawn along the screen.
Xside [15] is a more recent drawing-based scheme designed
for touchscreen devices.
Cued-recall schemes, such as Passpoints [16], require
users to perform actions on specific locations of an
image or screen. Users of Passpoints are asked to specify
‘‘click-points,'' areas that need to be touched, in a pre-defined
image. Authentication is achieved by touching all of the click
points in the image. The idea is that a user can chose a
personal image, for example a picture of a star, and chose
click points that are memorable or meaningful to the user, for
example the points of the star.
PicassoPass [17], another cued-recall scheme, asks users
to recall one piece of visual information from up to five
different layers (color, image, letter, location, and shape).
For example, a password may consist of the choices: red,
top left corner, circle. Layers are superimposed over each
other during authentication. The user effectively picks one
value from one dimension (layer) at a time to authenticate,
while other dimensions are used as distractions for potential
observers.
B. MOBILE AUTHENTICATION

Various authentication schemes have been implemented in
mainstream smartphone operating systems. The existing
authentication schemes trade security for memorability and
usability.
Authentication on Apple's iOS operating system is based
on four-digit PINs. A four-digit PIN is entered on a classic
PIN pad displaying the digits 0-9. Thus only 10,000 pass
words are possible. This scheme is clearly intended only
to discourage unauthorized use by adversaries who lack
time or dedication. Zezshwitz et al. developed SwiPin [18],
a scheme based on PINs which takes advantage of gesture
recognition capabilities on mobile devices for input rather
than classic button pressing.
Android's pattern unlock scheme presents a user with a
3 × 3 grid of dots.1 Similar to Draw-A-Secret, a user creates
1A larger gird is possible in recent versions of the Android operating
system. We focus on the default size of the grid in this paper. Our analysis
and conclusion discussed below still holds for larger grids.
VOLUME 6, 2018

a password by drawing lines connecting the dots in a certain
way. A valid pattern must consist of at least 4 dots, connected
only by straight lines that can be contained inside the grid.
The four-digit PIN is also available on Android operating
system. Recent versions of the Android operating system
rate it higher in security strength than the pattern unlock
scheme. Passwords made using this scheme are predictable
and prone to hotspots; a small subset of Android unlock
patterns are used by a large portion of users [19] and most
users tend to use the same heuristic rules to design their
passwords [20]. TinyLock [21], a pattern lock scheme, can
achieve high usability, but the total number of possible pat
terns in a 3 × 3 grid is only 389,112.
The picture authentication scheme developed for
Windows 8 allows users to upload an image and create a
password by drawing a series of three gestures on the image.
For example, the password could consist of drawing a circle
in the center of the screen, then a diagonal line connecting two
corners, then a tap in the center of the screen. The direction
of the circle (e.g. clockwise vs counterclockwise) is signifi
cant, as well as the direction the lines are drawn. Naturally,
a certain amount of inaccuracy is permitted when drawing
the gestures. Microsoft estimates [22] there are roughly 109
picture passwords using 3 gestures or less and 6 * 1011 picture
passwords using 4 gestures or less. However, this scheme is
vulnerable to dictionary attacks [23], [24] that analyze points
of interest in the reference image. For an image with 10 points
of interest, there are only about 106 combinations for picture
passwords of 3 gestures or less and 109 combinations for
picture passwords with 4 gestures or less [22].
According to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to
formallydefine the concept of multi-facet passwords and ana
lyze their benefits in terms of memory interference, security,
and usability. We filed a patent on MAPS in 2013 [25].
C. GAMIFICATION

Gamifying security is an idea that seeks to tie secu
rity mechanisms to games in order to improve security,
memorability, and usability [26]. For example, the Pass-Go
graphical system is based on the board game GO [27].
Hamari et al. [28] propose that gamifying an experience can
produce positive effects in learning and user experience.
Kroeze and Olivier [29] proposes that gamifying authentica
tion can enhance security via improved user behavior. In this
paper, we propose CMAPS, an implementation of MAPS
based on the chess game. Using CMAPS does not require
any knowledge of chess. In other words, anyone without any
knowledge of chess can use CMAPS easily, but players of
chess may experience the benefits of gamification.
III. THREAT MODEL

In this paper, we assume the attacker is interested in accessing
a mobile device for sensitive data or sensitive applications
installed on the mobile device. For example, many ser
vices utilize mobile devices as the key to password recovery
and the device access allows attackers to compromise these
54797
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services simply by stealing the victim's phone and triggering
the password recovery process. We also make the following
assumptions on the attacker's capability:
1) We assume the attacker has physical access to the
mobile device because (a) the mobile device is stolen,
(b) the mobile device is decommissioned, or (c) simply
the owner is away from the mobile device.
2) We assume that the attacker cannot simply disassemble
the mobile device and obtain the sensitive data or sen
sitive applications from the storage taken out of the
device for various reasons such as device encryption.
3) We assume that the attacker cannot obtain the sensitive
data through network connections over Wifi or 3G/4G
communications.
4) We assume that the device owner cannot or has not yet
wiped the device remotely through device protection
features such as the remote erase feature supported by
Apple's Find My iPhone/iPad service.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR MOBILE AUTHENTICATION

The goal of mobile authentication is to prevent unauthorized
access or make the cost of unauthorized access as high as
possible. For mobile devices, authentication schemes should
satisfy memorability and usability requirements in addition to
requirements on security strength. The details of the require
ments are presented below:
Security: The scheme should be capable of generating a large
amount of possible passwords so that the cost of a brute force
attack, in terms of time and effort, can be prohibitive. The
security strength of passwords generated with low counts of
input gestures is especially important for mobile authentica
tion because of the need for quick access to mobile devices.
Memorability: The passwords generated by the scheme
should be easy to remember. However, usually passwords
generated by schemes with a larger password space are harder
to remember. Another challenge to memorability is memory
interference, which occurs in human memory when informa
tion to store is similar to information previously stored in
memory [30]. One example is on alphanumeric passwords,
which consist of a string of letters and numbers. Memory
interference may occur when a user tries to remember the lat
ter part of a long password, or several passwords for various
accounts. This is because each position of an alphanumeric
password contains similar information: letters or numbers.
Memorability is usually evaluated through user studies.
Usability: Mobile devices are becoming increasingly popular
partly because of their usability. Because mobile devices are
often used for only moments at a time, it is essential that
authentication can be finished easily and quickly. In this
paper, we propose a usability metric based on the number
of touch gestures required to finish password input on a
touch screen of mobile devices. The usability of a mobile
authentication scheme can also be measured by the time to
finish one authentication. This measure depends on a user's
skills of using smartphones and a user's familiarity with
an authentication scheme. In addition to the two objective
54798

measures described above, the usability can also be measured
subjectively with a user survey to ask for users' opinions on
the usability of an authentication scheme.
V. MULTI-FACET PASSWORD SCHEME

In this section, we present the design of the Multi-fAcet Pass
word Scheme (MAPS) and use a Chess-based MAPS as an
example to explain the rationales behind the design. Then we
describe graphical hints designed to improve memorability of
MAPS.
A. DESIGN OF MULTI-FACET PASSWORD
FOR MOBILE AUTHENTICATION

The key idea of MAPS is to form a password by fusing
information from multiple facets. MAPS uses information
from multiple facets for two purposes: (1) By using infor
mation from multiple facets, a MAPS scheme can generate a
large number of possible passwords. (2) Using information
from multiple facets can increase the memorability of the
password. Alphanumeric passwords are relatively hard to
remember partly because of memory interference, as intro
duced in the previous section: Usually an alphanumeric pass
word is made by repeating the same type of information
and the repetition may hinder remembering the beginning
part of a password when the latter part of the password is
being memorized [30]. MAPS can reduce memory interfer
ence greatly because information from different facets is not
similar to each other. So, MAPS's using information from
multiple facets leads to both better security strength and less
memory interference.
To further increase MAPS's memorability and usability,
we design an information fusion process, which fuses infor
mation from multiple facets together. An example explaining
the fusion process is described in the next subsection.
We design MAPS as a graphical password for three rea
sons: (1) Graphical password schemes, which allow users
to authenticate themselves by drawing or choosing infor
mation based on visual input, are easier to remember than
textual password schemes because of the picture superior
ity effect [7]: Psychology researches indicate that humans
have tremendous capacity for processing and remembering
visual data, far exceeding our ability to process and remem
ber numbers and letters [31], [32]. (2) For mobile devices
equipped with touch screens, a graphical password scheme
is a natural choice. Typing text passwords on soft keyboards,
supported by most current mobile devices, can be relatively
slower because of the limited size of the keyboard [33].
In comparison with text password input via soft keyboards,
graphical passwords can be easier to input on these devices.
(3) Graphical passwords used on touch screens enable fusion
of information from multiple facets to increase memorability
and usability. More details on the fusion are explained in the
next subsection.
To better explain the design of MAPS, we present an
example MAPS based on the chess game below.
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 1. Screenshots of a CMAPS implementation. (a) An example CMAPS password.
(b) Unlock interface.

B. A CHESS-BASED MAPS (CMAPS)

Figure 1 shows two screenshots of our implementation of
Chess-based MAPS (CMAPS) developed for Android sys
tems. A CMAPS user sets a password by placing chess game
pieces onto a classical chess game board with 8 × 8 tiles.2 The
resulting chess formation is a CMAPS password. An example
password of CMAPS is shown in Figure 1(a). When the user
wants to unlock the mobile device later, CMAPS will display
a blank chess board and the chess game pieces as shown
in Figure 1(b). The user can try to unlock the system by
placing the game pieces back onto the game board. If the
chess formation input by the user is exactly the same as the
formation set inthe password setting phase, the mobile device
will be unlocked. The ‘‘Edit'' button in Figure 1 allows a user
to overwrite or empty a game piece on a tile inthe chess board.
A user can put a game piece onto the chess board with
one gesture connecting a selected game piece to a desired
tile in the board.3 No knowledge of chess is required to use
CMAPS as (1) CMAPS allows any game piece to be placed
on any tile in the chess board and (2) CMAPS allows any
possible chess formation including those illegal in a chess
game such as a formation with more than two kings. The
design is to allow a user without any chess knowledge to use
CMAPS. We also hypothesize that chess skills may help to
memorize passwords because a user may use a favorite chess
formation or a formation with some game pieces related by
attacking or defending for better memorability.

2The size of the chess board in the number of tiles can be adjusted
according to screen size. According to Fitts's law [34],[35], user interaction
can be slower and less precise when the size of tiles in a board is smaller,
especially for smaller screens.
3In the paper, we do not include the order in which game pieces are placed
onto the board as a part of a CMAPS password. But the order can be included
as a part of a CMAPS password and the password space can be further
enlarged.
VOLUME 6, 2018

TABLE 1. CMAPS facets.

Facet
Color
Type of Game Pieces
Location of a Game Piece

Choices
Black or White
King, Queen, Rook, Bishop, Knight, or pawn
Row and Column Choice on the Board

As an example of MAPS, CMAPS fuses information
from multiple facets. The facets used in CMAPS, as
shown in Table 1, include the color of the game piece
(black or white), the type of the game piece (king, queen,
rook, bishop, knight, or pawn), and the location of the game
piece (the row of the desired tile and the column ofthe desired
tile). CMAPS fuses the information from these facets with
one gesture on a touch screen that simply puts a game piece
onto a chess board.
C. GRAPHICAL HINTS

To further improve the memorability of MAPS, we ask
users to design graphical hints for their MAPS passwords.
The graphical hints are kept in the user's memory only:
(1) CMAPS cannot store graphical hints generated by users.
(2) CMAPS cannot display any graphical hints to a user when
the user wants to unlock a device.
For CMAPS, we use the example hints shown in Figure 2
to help users to create their own graphical hints. The example
hints are only shown to the participants in our user study for
the demo purpose only. Our user study shows that participants
generated interesting graphical hints in various ways. More
details can be found in Section VII. In Figure 2(a), the game
pieces represent American football players arranged on a
playing field, with endzones and the 50 yard line marked
by black lines. The quarterback, linebackers, receivers, and
runningbacks are represented with different game pieces. The
quarterback is labeled QB and the linemen are labeled LM.
54799
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FIGURE 2. Example graphical hints. (a) A football formation. (b) A family in their home. (c) A basketball game.

The hint in Figure 2(b) simulates a family, with the father rep
resented by a black king working on a computer, the mother
represented by a white queen playing piano, the older daugh
ter represented by a white pawn doing homework on a desk,
and the younger son represented by a black pawn playing
video games. In Figure 2(c) the chess formation is used to
represent two basketball teams playing on a basketball court.
The two teams are in different colors and players in different
positions are represented by different types of game pieces.
Unlike pictures in the picture password scheme of
Windows 8, graphical hints will not make CMAPS vulnerable
to dictionary attacks. Microsoft's picture password is vulner
able to dictionary attacks [24] because the picture used in the
scheme is shown for authentication and hot spots in the pic
ture, such as facial features in a face picture, make dictionary
attacks feasible. In CMAPS, an authentication always starts
with an empty chess board. CMAPS has no knowledge of
graphical hints and only users know their own graphical hints.
We hypothesize that graphical hints can reduce the popu
larity of hotspots, which are defined as frequently selected
spots in graphical passwords. Hotspots in graphical pass
words enable attackers to launch dictionary attacks [34],
which can be significantly more efficient than brute force
attacks on graphical password schemes. In CMAPS, if graph
ical hints are not used, hotspots such as corners or the center
of the chess board can be very frequently selected by users for
ease of remembering. Similarly certain game pieces can be
selected more often than other game pieces. We hypothesize
that graphical hints can also reduce the popularity of hotspots
in the type of game pieces. More analysis on hotspots in
CMAPS is presented in Section VII.
VI. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this subsection, we first measure the security strength of
MAPS and then use CMAPS as an example for security anal
ysis. We evaluate the security strength of MAPS and CMAPS
with the size of the password space, i.e., the number of
54800

possible passwords. The size of password space indicates the
probability of obtaining a password through random guess.
1) SECURITY STRENGTH OF MAPS

Assuming the facets in a MAPS are all independent, we can
derive the number of possible passwords supported by MAPS
as follows.
Proposition 1: For MAPS with n independent facets and
mi possible choices in the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) facet, the number
of possible passwords having l times of information fusion
is Πn
i=1 mli
Each information fusion combines choices from all the
facets together. So each fusion can have in=1 mi possible
combinations because of the independence. With l times of
information fusion, MAPS can generate in=1 mil different
passwords.
From Proposition 1, we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 2: The size of the password space generated by
adding t possible choices to one existing facet is no greater
than the size of the password space generated by adding one
more facet with t possible choices when t ≥ 2 and the number
of existing choices in each facet is greater than or equal to
two. Only when t = 2 and the facet to add t possible choices
has only two possible choices before the addition, the two
methods generate password spaces of the same size.
The proof of Corollary 2 is straightforward as adding a
facet with t possible choices will enlarge the password space
by t l times where l is the times of information fusion. The
proof of Corollary 2 can be found in Appendix A. When t ,
the number of possible choices to add, is small, the size dif
ference of the password spaces generated by the two methods
is not significant. But when t increases, the ratio between the
size of the password space generated by adding one more
facet of t possible choices and the size of the password space
generated by adding t possible choices to an existing facet is

mlj/(1+mj/t)l if we assume that the t possible choices are added to
the jth facet and mj denotes the number ofpossible choices in
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 3. Security strength comparison. (a) Number of passwords supported by different number of gestures. (b) Number of passwords supported by
two, four, and eight gestures.

the jth facet before the addition. When t≫ mj, the ratio4 can
be approximated as mlj , which grows exponentially with l,
the times of information fusion. Furthermore, adding more
facets and splitting the t possible choices into the added facets
can lead to an even larger password space.
Corollary 2 shows the advantage of MAPS over traditional
passwords. Traditional passwords such as the alphanumeric
passwords and four-digit PINs are essentially one- facet pass
words. MAPS, designed to fuse information from multiple
facets, can have a significantly larger password space.
2) SECURITY STRENGTH OF CMAPS

In CMAPS, the row and the column are dependent because
only one game piece is allowed to be placed in one tile of the
chess board.
Proposition 3: With l gestures, CMAPS with the classical
chess board of eight rows and eight columns can generate
2l 6l 6l4 possible passwords.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix B.
Based on the results in Proposition 3, we compare CMAPS
with the PIN-based approach used in Apple's iOS and
Google's Android system and the alphanumeric password
schemes in terms of the security strength.5 *For fair compar
ison, we assume that the same number of gestures are used
to generate passwords in the password schemes. In iOS, one
gesture can select one digit to be used in a passcode. For
fair comparison, we assume a PIN can have more than four
digits. We assume that one gesture can select one digit or one
letter in either the upper case or the lower case to be used
4The ratio will increase with t . But adding more facets to share the t
possible choices can lead to even larger password space.
5We do not include Google's pattern unlock scheme into the comparison
because: (1) A pattern used for a pattern unlock can be finished with one
long gesture connecting multiple dots in a 3 × 3 grid. (2) In the security
setting menu of the Android operating system, the pattern unlock, PIN, and
alphanumeric password are rated as medium security, medium to high secu
rity, and high security respectively. We do not include the picture password
in Windows 8 because no design details such as the resolution in a circle
gesture recognition, i.e., how different two circle gestures can be regarded as
the same gesture, are available for the quantitative analysis.
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in an alphanumeric password, even though for numbers and
capital letters an additional gesture may be required to swap
to the numeric portion of the soft keyboard or to press the shift
key. We do not consider alphanumeric passwords which allow
special characters. Similarly, we also assume that in CMAPS,
one gesture can put a game piece onto a desired tile in a chess
board.
Figure 3, generated based on the assumptions, com
pares the security strength of the password schemes. From
Figure 3(a), we can observe: (1) When the number of gestures
is less than 20, CMAPS can generate many more passwords
than the PIN-based approach and the alphanumeric password
scheme. As most of the alphanumeric passwords used for
banking are between eight and 20 characters long, the secu
rity strength of CMAPS is higher than the strength required
for banking, which is also much higher than the security
strength of current mobile authentication schemes such as
the PIN-based approach. (2) When the number of gestures
is larger than 24, the alphanumeric password scheme can
generate more passwords than CMAPS, but CMAPS can
still potentially generate about 1020 times more passwords
than the PIN-based approach. Figure 3(b) shows that twogesture, four-gesture, and eight-gesture CMAPS passwords
can generate about 2900, 1.3 × 106, and 1.9 × 1010 times
more passwords than the PIN-based approach respectively
and about 75, 890, and 8,700 times more passwords than the
alphanumeric password scheme respectively.
B. USABILITY ANALYSIS

In this subsection, we analyze the usability of CMAPS and
compare CMAPS with other password schemes in terms
of usability. CMAPS satisfies the same set of usability
requirements [35] as existing graphical password schemes on
mobile devices such as the pattern unlock scheme and the
picture password scheme. For example, CMAPS does not
require a user to carry any additional physical object and the
scheme does not require physical user effort beyond gestures
on touch screens. In this paper we focus on the ease of
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using the password schemes. We evaluate the usability of the
schemes with two metrics: the number of gestures required
to finish one authentication and the actual time needed to
finish one authentication. Both metrics measure the ease
of inputting passwords to a mobile device. The difference
between the two metrics is that the second measure depends
heavily on a user's familiarity with the authentication scheme
in a study and a user's skillfulness in using a mobile device.
In this section, we analyze usability with the first metric.
The second metric is used in the user study presented in the
next section to evaluate usability with timing data collected
by the CMAPS application developed for Android smart
phones. To obtain direct feedback from users on the usability
of CMAPS, we also ask participants of the user study to
finish a survey on usability comparison between CMAPS
and existing schemes and the survey results are presented
in Section VII.
1) NUMBER OF GESTURES REQUIRED
TO FINISH A PASSWORD

CMAPS users can place a game piece onto the game board by
a gesture drawing a line between a selected game piece and a
tile on the chess board. A CMAPS password having l game
pieces requires l gestures to input.
TABLE 2. Number of Gestures Required for Different Password Strength.
(For fair comparison, we remove the limit on the number of digits in a
PIN and the number of dots in the pattern unlock scheme. The numbers
for the pattern unlock are the lower bounds of segments between
successive dots required to achieve different password strength as we
assume it is possible to connect one dot with any other dot in a grid for
simplification. The numbers for alphanumeric passwords are also the
lower bounds as we assume that an alphanumeric password of l
characters can be completed in l gestures. In reality a user will need to
use an extra gesture to press the shift key or switch from the letter
keyboard to the symbolic keyboard.)

Number of Passwords

1010

1020

1030

1040

1050

PIN
Alphanumeric
Pattern Unlock
CMAPS

10
6
12
4

20
12
23
9

30
17
34
15

40
23
45
22

50
28
56
30

For fair comparison, we assume that passwords generated
by all the password schemes are of the same level of security
strength.6 *Table
* 2 shows the comparison results. A user can
finish a pattern in the pattern unlock scheme with one long
gesture that connects a number of dots in a 3 × 3 grid.
So the gesture connecting multiple dots consists of multiple
segments between successive dots. A CMAPS password can
also be possibly completed with one gesture connecting mul
tiple games pieces to multiple tiles sequentially, as shown in
Appendix C. For fair comparison, Table 2 shows the number
of segments, i.e. lines connecting two dots, required to finish
patterns used in the pattern unlock scheme.
From Table 2, we can observe that CMAPS requires much
fewer gestures to achieve similar security strength than other
6The metric, number of gestures required for a level of password strength,
is essentially a reverse way to measure the number of passwords supported
by a fixed number of gestures.
54802

approaches when the size of password space is below 1040.*
Compared to the pattern unlock scheme and the PIN-based
approach, CMAPS requires no more than half the gestures
for password spaces between 1010 and 1030.
VII. USER STUDY
A. OVERVIEW

The goal of the user study is to evaluate the memorability
and usability of CMAPS. The study has two sessions. Both
sessions are conducted in a controlled laboratory environment
to avoid distractions.
During the first session, participants are asked to fill
out a consent form with demographical information. They
were asked to provide their age range, gender, educational
background, skill level of using smartphones, and their
chess knowledge. Then we continue with an introduction
on CMAPS. Before leaving the laboratory, participants were
asked to generate a CMAPS password and recall the password
successfully on a smartphone.
To simulate regular use of the passwords as in previous
research [36], we sent an email to the participants two days
and four days after their first sessions respectively. The emails
contain a link to an online emulator of the CMAPS applica
tion hosted on Google Sites. The emulator is based on the
same code used to generate the application on Android smart
phones so the online emulator and the smartphone application
have the same user interface and they function in the same
way. Participants are encouraged to recall their CMAPS pass
words through the online emulator. Use of the emulator is
not mandatory because (1) the email response rates may be
low and as email communications may not be reliable [37]
and (2) we would like to compare password memorability of
participants who used the emulator against memorability of
those who did not use the emulator to investigate the effect
of the daily use of CMAPS passwords.
One week after the first session, participants were invited
to return to the controlled laboratory for the second session.
Participants were asked to recall their CMAPS passwords
through the smartphones that they used in the first session.
Participants were allowed to recall their passwords within five
minutes. At the end of the second session, participants were
asked to fill out a survey rating the usability of CMAPS and
their favorite mobile authentication scheme.
B. APPARATUS

An application of CMAPS was implemented and installed
on a Samsung Galaxy S4 smartphone configured with the
Android Jelly Bean (version 4.2) operating system. The
phone is equipped with a 5in Super AMOLED capacitive
touchscreen with a 1920 × 1080 (441 pixels per inch) display
resolution. The Android application records attempts made
by participants and timing information of each attempt. The
implementation does not enforce any rules of chess. Any
piece of either color can be positioned on any tile in the chess
board, and multiple pieces of the same type are permitted
VOLUME 6, 2018
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(e.g. three kings). Only one piece (or no piece) can be placed
on any particular tile. Two screen shots ofthe CMAPS appli
cation on Android smartphones are shown in Figure 1.
C. CONDITIONS

To evaluate the memorability and usability of CMAPS pass
words with different security strength, we assign participants
randomly into the following four conditions: (1) 2g: CMAPS
passwords in this condition must be generated with two
gestures. (2) 8g: CMAPS passwords in this condition must
be generated with eight gestures. (3) 8+g: Participants were
asked to generate CMAPS passwords with more than eight
gestures. We do not specify a fixed number of gestures in
this condition to allow participants to generate CMAPS pass
words withas many gestures as they desire. (4)8+gh:Before
generating CMAPS passwords in this condition, participants
were shown graphical hints in Figure 2. The participants
assigned into this condition were encouraged to generate their
own graphical hints and create their CMAPS passwords based
on their own graphical hints. The graphical hints are not
stored or displayed in the smartphone application.
D. STATISTICAL TESTING

We use a significance level of 0.05 for our hypothesis
testing unless otherwise specified. For omnibus compar
isons between categorical and continuous data, we used
Chi-squared (χ 2) analysis and Kruskal-Wallis (KW) analy
sis respectively. If the omnibus test is significant, we per
form pairwise tests with Chi-squared for categorical data and
Mann-Whitney for quantitative data.
E. PARTICIPANTS

This research was approved by the ethics board of all partic
ipating universities. We recruited participants by distributing
fliers and leaflet style advertisements. A ten dollar cash incen
tive was offered for participants who finished both sessions.
Sixty-six participants were recruited for the user study and
54 participants finished both sessions. Of the 54 participants
who completed the user study, 28 were male and 26 were
female. Forty participants were undergraduates, 12 were doc
toral or master students, one was staff, and one declined
to specify. Twenty eight participants were in engineering
majors, 11 were in science majors, and 15 in arts and human
ities majors. Twenty six participants were aged between
21 and 25 and 20 were aged 20 and under. Participants
were asked ‘‘Are you skilled at using Smartphones or mobile
devices.'' On a scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly
Agree (5), participants rated their skill at using smartphones
an average of4.07, with 81% ofparticipants rating their skill 4
or higher.
Among the 66 participants who finished the first session,
12 participants did not return to finish the second session,
so the overall dropout rate was 18%. Six of the participants
who did not complete the second session indicated a schedule
conflict as their reason for failing to attend. The others did
not respond to our inquiry after the first session. Of the
VOLUME 6, 2018

12 dropouts, one (8%) was in the 2g condition, two (17%)
were in the 8g condition, seven (58%) were in 8+g condition,
and two (17%) were in the 8+gh condition. The dropouts did
not vary significantly by condition (χ 2 = 5.3, p = 0.15).
Participant behavior during both sessions was monitored,
and participants who appeared distracted had their timing
data excluded from analysis. These participants were still
compensated as long as they finished both sessions.
F. MEMORABILITY

Table 3 shows the recall rates of CMAPS passwords in
each condition after one week. The recall rates are 87%
for CMAPS passwords in 8+gh condition and 100% for
passwords in the other conditions. The recall results did not
vary significantly by condition (χ 2 = 5.4, p = 0.15). The
results indicate that CMAPS, with security strength exceed
ing the strength of current mobile authentication schemes
and exceeding the requirements of banking, can achieve high
recall rates respectively.
TABLE 3. Recall rates of CMAPS passwords.

Conditions
2g
8g
8+g

8 + gh

Participants

Recall

Recall Rate

8
18
13
15

8
18
13
13

100%
100%
100%
87%

To investigate the effect of graphical hints on memorabil
ity, we compare results in 8+g and 8+gh conditions. The
comparison results indicate that graphical hints did not have
significant effect on memorability (χ 2 = 1.87, p = 0.17).
The results are against our expectation that graphical hints can
improve memorability of CMAPS. Our conversations with
participants in 8+g condition revealed that many of them
already used graphical hints to generate CMAPS passwords
without any instruction from us. This fact explains the high
recall rate for passwords in 8+g condition. In the user study,
participants have created various interesting graphical hints.
More details on the graphical hints can be found in the
technical report.
We also investigated the effect ofusing the online emulator
between the two sessions on the memorability of CMAPS.
To simulate the regular use of passwords, we sent two
emails with a link to the online emulator two days and
four days after the first session respectively. The majority
of participants (87%) responded to at least one email by
recalling passwords through the emulator, with 33% respond
ing to both. Only two participants failed to remember their
passwords, and both of these participants responded to one
email. An omnibus Chi-Squared test on the four conditions
(response to both emails, response to the first email only,
response to the second email only, and no response) shows no
significance(χ2 = 1.68, p = 0.64).Formanyusers,CMAPS
passwords remain memorable after one week without
use.
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TABLE 4. Pairwise testing on password entry time.

Comparison

Z score

P-value

2g vs 8g
2g vs 8+g
2g vs 8+gh
8g vs 8+g
8g vs 8+gh
8+g vs 8+gh

1.70
1.04
2.36
0.11
-1.77
-2.03

.09
.30
.01
.91
.08
.04

TABLE 5. Average usability rating of CMAPS and other schemes.

Scheme

CMAPS-2g
CMAPS-8g
CMAPS-8+g
CMAPS-8+gh
4-digit PIN
Google Pattern
Fingerprint

Ratings

Convenience

Speed

8
18
13
15
29
7
11

4.5
4
4.08
3.67
4.48
4
4.46

3.88
3.61
3.54
3.6
4.52
4.29
4.64

G. USABILITY

We evaluate the usability of CMAPS with timing data col
lected by the smartphone application and survey data col
lected through the usability survey.
1) PASSWORD ENTRY TIME

The smartphone application records timing information
of each authentication attempt. Participants had only one
authentication session each, and were not permitted to prac
tice beforehand. Only timing data from participants whom
we observed to be distracted during the second session
was excluded. Examples of distraction include dropping the
device or accidentally closing/minimizing the application.
The attempts were excluded because allowing those partic
ipants another attempt would give them an unfair advantage.
Roughly 5% of the data was omitted in this manner. The recall
rates are calculated with the distracted participants included.
We examined the total authentication time, including
unsuccessful attempts and time that users spent on thinking
between attempts. Participants required a mean of 10, 21,
23, and 25 seconds to authenticate themselves in the 2g, 8g,
8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis
test using the timing data from the four conditions (2g, 8g,
8+g, and 8+gh) indicates significance (H = 10.998, p <
0.012). Pairwise Mann-Whitney comparisons between the
categories show significant differences between 2g and 8g
(Z = 2.69, p = .007), and between 2g and 8+gh (Z = 3.01,
p = .002). Despite 8+g being slower than both 2g and 8g on
average, there was no significant difference between 2g and
8+g (Z = 1.27, p = .20). We attribute this result to 3 excep
tionally fast outliers in 8+g who required 10 seconds or less
to authenticate themselves. The fastest 70% of users in each
condition authenticated in a mean of 9, 14, 11, and 19 seconds
respectively.
The total password entry time for a CMAPS password
is comparable to other graphical schemes such as Deja
Vu (31-36s) [11], CDS (20s) [38], Story (23s) [38], and Draw
a Secret (5-12s) [39].7
We also examined the time spent on only the first suc
cessful attempt. The time is calculated as time from when
the screen with the board loads to first correct authentica
tion, or from previous unsuccessful authentication to suc
cessful authentication. Participants required a mean of 10,
14, 14, and 20 seconds for the first successful authentication
7Deja Vu, CDS, and Story use a mouse for input. Draw a Secret is based
on a touch screen.
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attempt in the 2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively.
As expected, authentication time increases with the number
of gestures. A Kruskal-Wallis test using the timing data from
the four conditions indicates significance (H = 8.08, p <
0.044). Table 4 shows pairwise comparisons with the two
tailed Mann-Whitney test. Both 2g and 8+g show signifi
cance with 8+gh, however 8g does not, which we attribute
to a small number of fast outliers in 8g. We attribute the lack
of significance between 8+g and 8g to users in 8+g opting
to use as few pieces as possible.
The password entry time for one entry of a CMAPS pass
word is comparable to other schemes such as CDS (14s),
Story (9s), Xside (3-4s) [15], SwiPIN (4-5s) [18], and TinyLock (2-4s) [21]. We note that 4 gesture CMAPS can generate
1.3 × 106 times more passwords than 4-digit PIN or SwiPin,
and 33,859 times more passwords than the total number of
possible passwords in Android's pattern unlock or TinyLock
with a 3 × 3 grid.
The average number of attempts required to authenticate
also increases with the number of gestures. Participants in 2g,
8g, 8+g, and 8+gh required 1, 1.3, 1.4, and 1.4 attempts
for each condition respectively. A Kruskal-Wallis test on the
attempts required shows no significance (H = 1.144, p =
0.767).
We did not conduct a user study on existing mobile authen
tication schemes to compare CMAPS against existing mobile
authentication schemes on the password entry time and mem
orability because the comparison will be biased. Existing
schemes such as the pattern unlock scheme and the four-digit
PIN are already being used by the participants. So the par
ticipants may simply reuse their current passwords in the
user study. Even if the participants did not use their current
passwords, their familiarity with the existing schemes causes
bias in the comparison as they only used CMAPS for a couple
of times and the existing schemes are being used daily. So we
conduct a usability survey to compare CMAPS against the
existing schemes.
2) USABILITY SURVEY

Participants finish a usability survey at the end of the sec
ond session. In the survey, we asked participants whether
they agreed with the following statements: (1) the authen
tication scheme is convenient, and (2) entering a password
with the authentication scheme is fast. Participants rate
CMAPS in their condition (2g, 8g, 8+g, or 8+gh), and
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 4. Survey results. (a) Entering password convenient. (b) Entering password fast.

whichever authentication scheme is currently used by the par
ticipant, or their favorite scheme if they do not currently use
any kind of authentication. The possible choices are strongly
disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, and strongly agree. For
quantitative analysis, the choices are converted to 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Figure 4 shows the survey
results and the average usability rating results are shown
in Table 5.
Responses from the survey were further sorted as either
unsatisfactory (1-3) or satisfactory (4,5). Table 6 shows that
CMAPS has no significant difference in usability among the
four conditions (2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh).
TABLE 6. Statistical analysis on usability data for CMAPS.

Convenience

x2
Omnibus

3.36

Category
2g vs 8g
2g vs 8+g
2g vs 8+gh
8g vs 8+g
8g vs 8+gh
8+g vs 8+gh

2.10
2.15
3.41
.003
3.41
.509

P
.399

Speed

x2
2.56

Pairwise Test Result
.147
.181
.142
.940
1.02
.065
.955
.523
.065
.609
.476
.068

Convenience

x2
2g vs PIN
8g vs PIN
8+g vs PIN
8+gh vs PIN
2g vs Patt
8g vs Patt
8+g vs Patt
8+gh vs Patt
2g vs print
8g vs print
8+g vs print
8+gh vs print

.284
.198
4.01
7.50
NA
1.85
.359
3.02
NA
2.84
2.90
2.90

P
.594
.656
.045
.006
NA
.174
.549
.082
NA
.092
.089
.089

Speed

x2
.284
7.83
11.8
12.4
.268
.907
2.03
2.16
3.07
4.62
6.77
7.02

P
.594
.005
.001
.001
.605
.341
.154
.141
.080
.032
.009
.008

P
.465

.671
.332
.310
.470
.465
.795

We further compared CMAPS with authentication schemes
in use by the participants. Since each participant is only
asked about CMAPS and the authentication scheme in use,
only pairwise testing is used for analysis. Table 7 shows our
results. Not included in the table are the five participants
who never used another mobile security scheme, the only
one participant who chose facial recognition, and the only
one who chose the windows picture password. In terms of
convenience, participants felt that CMAPS in 8g was not
significantly different from the four-digit PIN, the pattern
unlock scheme, and the fingerprint scheme. CMAPS in 8+g
and 8+gh were rated as significantly less convenient than the
four-digit PIN. In terms of input speed, CMAPS with more
VOLUME 6, 2018

TABLE 7. Statistical Analysis Comparing CMAPS to Other Schemes.
(CMAPS results are sorted by gesture. Other schemes are abbreviated for
brevity. PIN: four-digit PIN, Patt: Google's pattern unlock, print:
fingerprint scheme. Two categories could not be tested because they had
perfect ratings. Significant p values are bolded for visibility.)

than two gestures was rated lower than the four-digit PIN
and fingerprint, but was not significantly different from the
pattern unlock scheme.
The convenience results in Table 4 indicate that user sat
isfaction to CMAPS in 2g and 8g is at the same level as the
user satisfaction to four-digit PIN. The results also show that
user satisfaction to CMAPS in 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh is at the
same level as user satisfaction to pattern unlock.
From the survey data, we can conclude that CMAPS
in 2g, with security strength exceeding the strength ofcurrent
mobile authentication schemes, can be used as an acceptable
alternative to existing authentication schemes such as the
four-digit PIN in terms of usability. We can also observe
that CMAPS in 8g, with security strength exceeding the
requirements of banking, is comparable with current mobile
authentication schemes in terms of usability.
H. HOTSPOTS

Hotspots, defined as frequently selected spots in graph
ical passwords [34], enable attackers to launch efficient
54805
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FIGURE 5. Popularity of Tiles (The gray level of each tile indicates the popularity of each tile. The most popular tile and the least popular tiles are in the
color black and the color white respectively.) From left to right: 2 piece, 8 piece, unlimited (8+) pieces, unlimited (8+) pieces with hints.

FIGURE 6. Popularity of different piece types.

attacks such as the dictionary attack. Hotspots reduce uncer
tainty in password choices. Graphical schemes that depend
on pictures or images can be vulnerable to hotspots [40].
In this paper we evaluate the hotspot effect with Shannon's
entropy [41], an information-theoretical measure of uncer
tainty. The entropy E is defined as follows:
E = -Σi pi log2 pi

(1)

where pi denotes the probability of selecting the ith choice.
In CMAPS, the hotspot effect may exist in the choices on the
tiles of the chess board and in the choices on the type of game
pieces.

3.75, 5.25, 5.26, and 5.76 bits respectively. So the hotspots in
tile selection reduce the uncertainty by 2.25, 0.75, 0.74, and
0.24 bits in 2g, 8g, 8+g, and 8+gh conditions respectively.
The reduction in uncertainty, i.e., the popularity of hotspots
decreases as the number of gestures increases since more tiles
are to be used. The data also shows that graphical hints can
reduce popularity of hotspots when we compare the entropy
of 8+g with the entropy of 8+gh. Overall the entropy of 8g,
8+g, and 8+gh conditions are very close to the maximum
entropy of 6.00 bits. The results indicate that when the num
ber of gestures is larger than eight, the hotspot effect can be
largely ignored as the popularity ofeach tile is about the same.
2) HOTSPOTS IN PIECE SELECTION

1) HOTSPOTS IN TILE SELECTION

Figure 5 shows popularity of tiles. We can observe that some
tiles, particularly the corner tiles, were chosen more often
than others. Assuming a uniform distribution on the tile selec
tion, we can calculate entropy Etile uniform = 6.00 bits according
to the entropy defined in Equation 1 as pi = 1/
64, 1 ≤ i ≤ 64.
Similarly we can calculate the entropy ECtile, denoted as the
entropy of tile selection in Condition C . According to the
popularity shown in Figure 5, E2tigle, E8tigle , E8ti+leg , and E8ti+legh are
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Figure 6 shows the distribution of piece types. Ideally each
piece will be selected 100/6 = 17% of the time. Our data
shows that pawns, rooks, queens, and kings were placed 18%,
14%, 16%, and 15% of the time respectively. Knights were
placed 28% of the time, while bishops were placed only 9%
of the time.
Assuming a uniform distribution on the selection of
the piece type, we can calculate entropy of piece type
Etype unifrom = 2.59 bits according to the entropy definition
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FIGURE 7. Example graphical hints created by users.

in (1) as pi = 1/6, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. Similarly we can cal
culate the entropy Etype C, denoted as the entropy of piece
type selection in Condition C . According to the popularity
shown in Figure 6, E2tygpe , E8tygpe , E8ty+pge , and E8ty+pgeh are 2.31,
2.52, 2.44, and 2.34 bits respectivel+y. The resu+lts show the
number of gestures does not have a predictable effect on
hotspots in piece type. We can also observe that the entropy
of each condition is very close to the maximum entropy
of 2.59 bits. It indicates that the hotspot effect can be largely
ignored.
I. GRAPHICAL HINTS CREATED BY PARTICIPANTS

Users in the 8+gh condition used an average of 13.6 pieces
with a median of 12. Only 20% of users in this category chose
to use 8 pieces exactly.
At the end of the experiment, we asked some 8+gh par
ticipants to describe their graphical hints. Some user gener
ated hints are presented here. Figure 7 shows some exam
ple graphical hints created by participants. Password (a)
is based on chess. The knights are used as a reference.
Each knight is attacking a queen, which is covering a
pawn. A pawn of the queen's color sits in the corner. Pass
word (b) is the letter H, with colors swapped between the
two sides. The bulk of the vertical lines are made up of
rooks, but the top and bottom of each line is capped with
a unique piece, and the horizontal center line is made from
kings.Password (c) represents a casino floor. The play tables
are on red tiles, denoted with knights. Pit bosses, denoted
as queens, watch the tables from the white tiles between
them. Password (d) is a house. The floor or foundation is
built from white rooks, and the remainder from black rooks.
Two women, their bodies made of pawns and their heads
made of queens, sit inside the house. Password (e) is a
cricket field, with different pieces denoting different players
around the two wickets. The queen is the user's favorite
player.
VIII. DISCUSSION

In this section, we discuss the impact of chess knowledge to
the memorability of CMAPS and an extension of CMAPS to
reduce or even eliminate side effects of password expiration
policies.
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A. IMPACT OF CHESS KNOWLEDGE

Participants indicated whether or not they could play chess
by answering yes or no in the consent form. Ignoring the
participants who did not answer, 81% answered yes, 19%
answered no. Only two users forgot their passwords, one that
knew how to play chess and one that did not. Thus we find
that chess knowledge does not have significant impact on
remembering the password (χ 2 = .26, p = 0.61), and it
means that CMAPS passwords are memorable even to people
with no knowledge of chess.

B. EXTENSION

To foil an attacker who obtains the older password through
various possible ways such as brute force attacks, intercep
tion, or simply guessing, system owners or administrators
prefer expiring old passwords every few months or weeks
and asking system users to generate new passwords. While
the password expiration policies can possibly help secure the
system by reducing the time that an attacker has to access
the system, the password expiration policies can cause extra
burden on system users such as interruption of ongoing work
and increase in login errors. Zhang et al. [42] even reported
that the knowledge of old passwords can help in breaking new
passwords.
MAPS can be extended to reduce or eliminate the side
effects of the password expiration policies. The extension is
to add a game facet to MAPS. In other words, when a user
is required to change an old password based on one game,
the user can select another game and form a new password
based on the new game. To better reduce or eliminate side
effects, the systems may use games that are as different as
possible. For example, if the old password is based on chess,
the system may suggest the user to use the game Monopoly
for the new password.
The game change can help reduce memory interference
in long term memory, which is used for continuing storage
of information [30], as the new game is completely different
from the old game and the passwords formed based on the
different games are less likely to cause memory interference.
The addition of the game facet can also prevent breaking
new passwords based on the knowledge of old passwords.
MAPS based on different games may have different sets of
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facets so no connection between new passwords and old pass
words is available. For example games chess and Monopoly
have different sets of game pieces/rules and completely dif
ferent game boards.
We plan to perform a user study on the extension in
our future work. Since passwords usually expire every
3 months or 6 months, the user study may take a long time.
IX. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose MAPS for mobile authentication.
MAPS can improve security, memorability, and usability
jointly. MAPS fuses information from multiple facets to
form a password. Using information from multiple facets can
improve security strength by enlarging the password space
and improve memorability by reducing memory interference.
The graphical hints can help users to memorize passwords.
Based on the idea of MAPS, we implemented CMAPS for
Android devices and conducted a user study on CMAPS with
the implementation. The user study shows that CMAPS, with
security strength exceeding the strength of current mobile
authentication schemes and exceeding the requirements of
banking, can achieve high recall rates. CMAPS enhances
usability by requiring significantly fewer touch gestures than
other schemes to achieve an equivalent password space.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PASSWORD SPACE OF MAPS

Proof: First the number of existing choices in each facet
has to be greater than or equal to two. If there is only one
possible choice in one facet, the facet can be removed and the
size of the password space will not change. So if we denote
the number of possible choices in the jth facet as mj, mj ≥ 2.
Without loss of generality, we assume the t possible choices
are added to the jth facet, so the size of the password space
generated by adding the t possible choices, denoted as S1, can
be derived according to Proposition 1 as follows:

where n denotes the number of existing facets and l denotes
the times of information fusion. The size of the password
space generated by adding one more facet of t choices,
denoted as S2, can be derived according to Proposition 1 as
follows:

where n denotes the number of existing facets and l denotes
the times of information fusion. Since t ≥ 2 and mj ≥ 2,
we can derive

(t - 1)(mj - 1) ≥ 1.

(4)

After simplification on Inequality 4, we can derive

tmj ≥ t + mj.
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(5)

Combining Equation 2 and Inequality 5, we can derive as
follows:

We have equality in 4, only if t = 2 and mj = 2. So the two
methods generate password space of the same size only when
t = 2 and mj = 2.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PASSWORD SPACE OF CMAPS

Proof: According to the description of CMAPS in
Section V-A, one gesture can select one game piece and
put the game piece onto the game board. So one gesture
in CMAPS is equivalent to one time of information fusion
in MAPS. The process of generating one l-gesture CMAPS
password can be equivalently divided into three phases:
(1) In the first phase, l game pieces are selected in order.
(2) In the second phase, l tiles on the chess board are selected.
(3) In the third phase, the selected l game pieces are put onto
the selected l tiles one by one according to the piece selection
order.
In the first phase, the number of possible permutations of l
game pieces is 2l6l because there are two colors and six types
of game pieces available for choices and the color facet is
independent from the facet of the piece type. We calculate the
number of possible permutations of l game pieces instead of
combination of l game pieces to remove duplicate passwords
generated because of different orders of putting game pieces
onto a game board. For example, one CMAPS password
with two white kings on two selected tiles can be created
in two different ways dependent on which king is first put
onto the board. But actually, the two passwords created in
different ways are identical. Even for different types of games
pieces, different orders of placing selected game pieces onto
a game board can generate duplicate passwords. So to remove
the duplicates caused by different orders, we calculate the
permutation of l game pieces to be put onto the board. The
permutation can remove duplicates because only one order of
placing the selected l game pieces onto their corresponding
tiles is counted in a permutation. We use corresponding tiles
in the previous sentence to emphasize that the selected pieces
will be put into selected tiles in the piece selection order.
In the second phase, l tiles are selected for the selected l
game pieces. Totally there are 64 tiles in the classical 8 × 8
chess board. So the number of possible combinations of l
selected tiles is (64l).
In the third phase, the l selected game pieces are put
onto the l selected tiles according to the piece selection
order. A selected tile is assigned to a selected game piece
as follows: (1) The selected tiles are ordered according to
their row numbers and column numbers in the chess board.
The tile in the ath row and bth column is labeled as the
[(a — 1) * 8 + b]th tile. (2) The l selected tiles are ordered
in a queue according to their labels. (3) Each game piece
VOLUME 6, 2018
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will be assigned to a tile that has the same position in the
queue as the game piece's position in the permutation. For
each permutation of l game pieces, there are 6l4 different
passwords. Given 2l6l permutations, one l-gesture CMAPS
can generate 2l6l 6l4 possible passwords.
Because of the removal of duplicates in the first phase and
the arrangement in the third phase, the piece selection and the
piece placement are independent. So in the final step of the
derivation, we can use multiplication to obtain the number of
possible passwords.
□
APPENDIX C
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF A SINGLE-GESTURE CMAPS

Figure 8 shows the possibility of finishing one CMAPS pass
word with one long gesture. In our future work, we will inves
tigate whether users will actually use one gesture to finish
CMAPS passwords. The popularity of the pattern unlock on
Android systems shows users' preference on authentication
with one long gesture.

FIGURE 8. One Gesture that completes a cmaps password of four game
pieces (The gesture starts from the white knight. For visual clarity, we use
different colors to draw segments to place different game pieces.)
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